HARRIS vs. THE SCHOONER KENSINGTON.

In the -DistrictCourt of the United Statesfor t1he South Carolina
Bistriet-in Admiralty.
GEORGE HARRIS vs. THE SCHOONER KENSINGTON.
1 It is a conceded proposition that, under the general maritime law, a lien arises or
is implied for the benefit of material-men, unless the ship be in her home port,
or credit be to the master or owner.
2. Where a lien arises under the maritime law, for the benefit of a material-man,
it is not waived or lost because a negotiable note between the parties to the ori-

ginal contract has been taken by the creditor, unless such note was taken as
payment; ,but if the party taking the note makes an absolute transfer of it, the
lien is thereby extinguished; hence, where A advanced money for a vessel's
supplies and repairs in a foreign port, and the master drew a draft on the owner,
which was accepted, but which subsequently came into the libellant's possession
and control, and was brought into court to be cancelled, it was held that the lien
was not extinguished.
3. The cases fully cited and commented on.

Libel in rem for money advanced for repairs and supplies.
MAGRATH, J.-The principal, if not the only question in this
case is, how far a material-man waives or affects his lien for repairs
or supplies under the general maritime law, by taking from the
owner or captain a negotiable security. As yet no decision of a
court of supreme and controlling authority can be cited; although
judges of great repute have expressed an opinion. That opinion is,
of course, to be weighed, whether it leads to a conclusion which
affirms or rejects the proposition; for each tribunal is responsible
for the correctness of its judgment; and not at liberty, perhaps to
rest upon the mere -weight of authority. Especially is this so when
a reasonable doubt forbids hearty acquiescence.
To the proposition that under the general maritime law, according to the rule of the civil law, a lien arises or is implied for the
benefit of the material-man, there is no exception ; and the rule is
equally well established, that he who advances money with which the
material-man is paid, is also entitled to a lien similar to that which
the material-man would have had. In the United States, the lien is
not allowed in the home port of the vessel, because it is the port at
or near which the owner resides; and upon him the creditor has
redress by his remedy inpersonam. It is equally well settled that
this lien of the maritime law is superceded by a personal credit given
to the owner or master. But the precise nature of this personal
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credit, bow its proof is to be made ; and whether, in the case of a
negotiable instrument, that proof is supplied or presumed from the
mere existence of the paper; are questions of embarrassment and
doubt, a partial solution of which is necessary in this case.
It has been held that whatever makes the repairs or supplies a
special contract excludes the lien; Bull. N. P. 45. But still the
question recurs, what is meant by a special contract? At one tile,
if the price was named the lien was excludted. But that doctrine
could not be maintained, and is now rejected. Button vs. Bragg,
7 Taunt. 14. In Stevenson vs. Blakeloc, 1 M. & S. 535, an
express antecedent contract was held to exclude an implied contract,
and with that, the lien which grew out of it. In ez yarte Lewis, .2
Gall. 483, a personal contract for a specific sum discharged the
implied lien. In the Vestor, 1 Sumner, 78, it was held that in
cases of repairs or supplies to a vessel in a foreign port, in addition
to the maritime lien, there is an obligation upon the owner and
master cumulative to the remedy of the lien. In Murray vs.
Lazarus, 1 Paine's C. 0. 375, a bill of exchange was held as the
substitution for the lien which otherwise would have been created;
while a recent commentator inclines to the opinion that if the bill
or note is that of the master or owner, such would not be the proper
conclusion; (Fland. Mar. Law, 193,) and Judge Betts, insists upon
a qualification still broader. The Schooner Active; Olcott R. 286.
At the common law, possession .is essential to the lien, and possession excludes the idea of credit; because credit is inconsistent
with a continuing possession of the creditor, and without that possession there is no lien. In a question of lien at the common law,
if credit is proved as a part of the contract, the lien by the same
proof is displaced; the credit and the lien being inconsistent. In
all cases, therefore, where the decision is to be made by the rule of
the common law, an easy and practical test is supplied.
But it is prolific of confusion to attempt a reconcilement of the
rule which applies to the lien at common law with that of the general
maritime law. In the one, to lose possession is to destroy the lien;
in the other, the purpose of the lien is to allow the owner to have
pos.session; that by it he may.derive benefit from the labor which
10

HARRIS vs. THE SCHOONER KENSINGTON.

the material-man has bestowed, in being enabled to prosecute his
voyage and secure his profits. In the one possession is its essence;
in the other it is not a necessary, or even proper quality. In the
one, possession is consistent; in the other, inconsistent with the lien.
It is obvious how inapplicable to the consideration of a maritime
lien are cases deciding questions under the lien of the common law.
In the case before me the lien is implied-created by law-existing independently of contract or agreement as necessary for its
support.. It is prina facie the security which the law presumes
one party intended to give, and the other to take. It survives without possession, or other act sustaining it, until discharged by payment, lost by neglect, or waived by a special contract which excludes
it. So high is it held that it will not be affected by the the owner's
act which creates a forfeiture; takes precedence of a sale to a bona
fide purchaser without notice; and is not postponed to a debt to the
United States. It is created and supported by the consideration of
its indispensable necessity; and is, therefore, not lightly superceded
or destroyed by courts, in which its enforcement in proper cases is
asked.
It must be borne in mind in the consideration of this and cognate
questions, that the judgment of courts in Great Britain rested upon
a basis not admitted here to be true or just. Who will reconcile the
law in questions of this kind as laid down by Lord Coke or Lord
Holt, with the more recent legislation of the Parliament of Great
Britain ? And how can we regard as rules for our guidance, decisions founded upon a jealousy no longer tolerated; and intended to
subvert a jurisdiction created by the constitution of the United
States? In the consideration of a maritime lien in this court we
should search for the rule of the maritime law; or for the special
legislation of the United States, if it has modified or changed the
rule; for the maritime law is the common law of the commercial
world; and to nations in their commercial relations, is what its common law statutes or customs are to each.
Starting from this point we will find that the lien claimed here
is the security which the maritime law implies in the case of those
who, in contracts like this, occupy the relation of debtor and creditor.
If the lien does not arise it is because it has been waived, lost, or
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paid. It may be waived by agreement; as an arrangement
for a mode of payment inconsistent with it; or when an exclusive and special credit is given to the owner or master, or both.
It must, however, be a special credit; for in cases where the lien
exists, there is a liability of the master and owner, auxiliary
and cumulative to it. The difficulty of deciding whether there has
been a personal credit excluding the lien is the same which we meet
in the civil law in the application of the doctrine of novations; in
equity in considering the substitution of securities; and at law in
deciding how far one contract operates as a suspension of or substitution for another. It is a question of evidence.
We have seen that a bill of exchange drawn by the captain and
accepted by the owner, if taken by the creditor, has been held a
waiver of the implied lien. 1 Paine, 375. Because, it is said, a
right to detain for the future event of the bill is inconsistent with
the bill. But the reason would be stronger if the bill was per se
pjayment, or if the credit involved in the time for which the bill was
drawn was inconsistent with the lien. If the bill is not per se payment, and if the time allowed for its payment is consistent with the
lien, the conclusion that its mere existence is proof of waiver, is in
the case of a maritime lien perhaps hastily made. The Albatross,
2 Wallace, 380. The acceptance of a bill thereby establishing a
credit, may be conclusive as to the extinguishment of a lien at the
common law; though even in that case I express no opinion; but it
is far from conclusive in the case of a maritime lien.
In the Nestor, 1 Sumner, 78, Judge Story considers at great
length the nature of the maritime lien, and the modes in which it;
may be waived or lost. He holds that supplies or repairs in a
foreign port are taken, as primafaciefurnished on the credit of the
ship and owners until the contrary is proved. But that taking; a
negotiable promissory note implies a waiver of the lien, because thia
lien may be in the hands of one person and the note in the possession of another. Whatever might be the effect of such a rule, if it.
were operative as a presumption of law, it is to me quite clear thatit cannot be supported for the reason now given. It is admitted in,
the same case that a continuing liability of the owner and master
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is not inconsistent with the lien, because they all by law arise at
the same time from the same contract. The promissory note is the
admission of a liability; and in itself adds nothing to what the law
intends; and the promise to pay is no more than the law implies
from the liability it has imposed. In fact, therefore, to use the
language of Lord Eldon, "the contract for payment for money is
itself, in a sense, a security full as good as a note." 15 Ves. 846.
That the creditor cannot pursue his remedy while the note is maturing is in effect a credit, but that is not inconsistent with the maritime lien. How far, in any case, a promissory note or bill of
exchange supercedes a former contract, is not a rule of law, but
results from the agreement of the parties. If then, taking a bill or
note is in no respect inconsistent with a maritime lien, it cannot
become so because of the allegation that the note may be in the
hands of one person and the lien be claimed by another. If that
consequence could result in any case, the objection made would have
weight in that case, supposing it possible that the lien survives after
the transfer of the debt. But it cannot have weight in a case where
the note or bill and the lien continue in the hands of the same person to whom they were originally given. Such would be the conclusion in a court of law. 2 Spear, 448 ; 1 Rich. 228; 2 Rich. 244;
8 Cowen, 77; 2 Story, 447. And such, of course, must be the conclusion in this court, from which we look not only to the court of
equity for guidance in certain cases, but to the civil law so far as
we can adopt it. I readily concede that the apprehension of damage sometimes leads to the adoption of an arbitrary rule, which may
in its operation even embrace cases in which there is no room for
that apprehension. But in such cases the rule is positive; and in
law a rule vhich is positive in the construction of rights and liabilities cannot be oppressive. If a bond is taken in settlement of a
pre-existing simple contract debt, it extinguishes that debt. This
is a presumption, and its general operation is fixed; but evidence
may control it, and the security of the bond become cumulative.
2 Rich. 608. If the pre-existing contract is asserted as discharged
by a negotiable instrument, and if it is so held, it is not because of
a rule of law, but from evidence showing that to have been the
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agreement of the parties. In Ramsay vs.-Allegro, 12 Wheat. 611,
the Supreme Court declined to lay down the rule, although it may
be inferred what it would have been if the case had rendered a judgment necessary.
In determining from circumstances, as distinguished from evidence
establishing an agreement, how far from them a certain consequence
will result, affecting another matter; the nature of the thing to be
affected is of much consideration. A greater security merges a
lesser ; and in securities of equal rank there is room for an easy
acquiescence in the conclusion that the latter was intended as a
substitute for the former. But the presumption that a higher
security was intended to be extinguished by one of less value calls
for evidence of the intention of the parties to support it. It is well
then, for us to understand the value and nature of this lien or
security, and the general principles which are applicable in cases of
the substitution of one debt for another.
It has been said that the term lien, used in the sense we have
been considering, is technically incorrect; that lien properly
only applies to the security at common law, with its incidents, as we
have seen them; and that its qualities are not such as are held by
it in common with the maritime lien. That the privilegium of the
civil law is more closely connected with the maritime lien; and is
"the right which the nature of his credit gives him, (the creditor) and which makes him preferred over other creditors, even those
who are inferior in point of time, and have mortgages." (Domat.)This priority extends either to all the goods of the debtor, or only
to certain things. Among creditors entitled to the privilege in the
same degree, (for there are different degrees and qualities of privilege) debts will bb paid in the same order, and in like proportions,
without regard to the time when they were made. "All privileges
make a particular appropriation which gives to the creditor who is
privileged, the thing for his pledge; although there be neither cove-nant nor condemnation which expressly mentions the preference." Domat. B. 1, p. 3. Whatever may be this security, privilege or pledge; ajus in re, orjus ad rem; it is enough that when

it arises there is a preference in the order of payment ; and if the
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creditor has not the right of a pawnee to sell, or of a lien creditor
at common law to retain possession, this court, in both respects, will
exercise the power for him. The source, too, of this security,
exhibits its nature, and the cause of the respect paid to it. In the
same manner in which we have derived from the civil law, the original, so to speak of this security; if, indeed, we are not indebted to
that code for the security itself; we must recur to the same code
for the principles which are the foundation of the rules which
guide us. in the substitution of one security for another. In
that code this was termed a novation; and was effected either by a
change of the obligation, or the substitution of one debtor for another;
the new debtor being substituted in the original obligation, or making
a new covenant. The latter mode was also called a delegation, but
both were comprehended under the title of aevation. The bare
effect of a second obligation was not sufficient to produce a novation,
unless it appeared that it was so intended; otherwise both would
subsist. But mere changes in an obligation, as adding to it new
security; or taking part of what it had; lengthening or shortening
the time of payment; would not make a novation, because they
would not operate to extinguish the first debt, unless it is expressly
said, it shall be null. Domat.
The principle of the novation is familiar in equity under a different term, and also at the common law. But while not discarding
the aid which we derive from the consideration which a court of law
gives to this question, it is rather to the rule as adopted in equity,
and to that of the civil law, so far as it is applicable, that we must
refer for our guidance in cases like this. In a work of general
authority it is said: "taking of a security has been deemed at most,
as no more than a presumption, under some circumstances, of an
intentional waiver of the lien ; and not as conclusive of the waiver."
2 Story Eq. sec. 1226. "Even the taking of a distinct and independent
security, as for instance, of a mortgage on another estate, has been
deemed not conclusive evidence that the lien is waived." Sec. 1226,
"Taking of bills of exchange drawn on and accepted by a third
person, or by the purchaser and a third person, has also been deemed
not to be a waiver of the lien, but only a mode of payment." Sec.
1226. U. ,S. vs. Lyman, 1 Mason, 495. But the doctrine thus
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laid down by Judge Story is by him modified in Gilman vs. Brown,
1 Mason, 219; and still more in its application to maritime securities in the Nestor, 1 Sumner, 78. The decision in the Chusan,
2 Story, 456, was rested upon the lex loci contractus. Of these
cases it may be said, that while the case of Gilman vs. Brown
cairied the rule of a waiver of the lien as far as the furthest doubt
which had been expressed; the greater extension of it in The Nestor
is without any other authority than that of the distinguished judge by
whom it was announced. In Gilman vs. Brown, Judge Story said:
"there is pretty strong, if not decisive, current of authority to lead
us to the conclusion, that merely taking the bond or note of the
vendee himself for the purchase money will not repel the lien."
"But where a distinct and independent security is taken, either of
property or responsibility of third persons, it certainly admits of a
very different consideration." The waiver, then, as insisted upon
by Judge Story, is wholly dependent upon taking a new, distinct
and independent security of person or property.. It must be distinct; and additional to that which the lien would afford. It may
be a new person whose obligation is taken, .or additional property
made subject to mortgage, to secure the debt. When it is claimed
that with no new parties, and without any additional security, an
implication arises of the waiver of the lien, it must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, as proving either a declaration plain, or
manifest intention not to rely longer upon the lien. Macikreth vs.
Symmes, 15 Yes. 829. Nor will the addition of a new person in
all cases discharge the original lien. In Grantvs. Xile8, 2 V. &
Bea. 309, the master of the rolls held that the acceptance of the
party upon whom the bill was drawn, was not the addition of a
new party, and with it a new security; for the acceptor was not a
surety, but considered as a person paying the bill out of the drawer's
funds in his hands; and, therefore, that the bill of exchange was
only a mode of payment, and not a security. 4 Kent Comm. 58,
and cases cited.
In the 'Volunteer,1 Sumner, 570, Judge Story, in a case where
a lien was claimed for freight, and denied because said to have been
waived by a charter-party ; held that unless there was a stipulation
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incompatible with the lien, it would attach. Such a test is practicable, and in its operation, just. If applied in this case, it will be
seen how the rule laid down in The Nestor, and that also, in Murray
vs. Lazarus, is untenable. What I have said in relation to the
latter case I may repeat as equally applicable to the former; that
to make the rule as laid down true, the note or bill must be in itself
payment; which it is not: or, because the note or bill operate as a
distinct and indepeneent security; which it is not when made
between parties to the original contract, and without an agreement
making it such; or, because it is inconsistent or incompatible with
the original lien, which it is not. None of these consequences are
involved in the making of a note or bill; and this is sufficiently
proved by the construction given to one of the securities, and which
is equally applicable to both; that it is a mode of payment, unless
by agreement taken as payment. Lyman vs. the Bank of the
United States, 12 How. 225. The Ellen Stewart, 5 McLean, 269.
Where the note or bill is transferred to a third person, and
becomes his property, the rule may be otherwise than as I have now
stated it. But even in that case, the objection that the note might
be in the hands of one person and the lien in that of another, could
not be supported; because the credltor who had parted with the note
could have no claim to retain the lien. If, after the note or bill was
transferred the lien continued to exist, it could only continue for
the benefit of the person who held the debt; but it could not exist for
him, as Judge Story, upon the authority of Emerigon, holds that
the lien cannot be transferred. And, as the right to the lien arose
from the right to the debt, and could not exist longer than the debt,
nor be claimed by the creditor except for the debt; whatever deprived
him of the right to the debt would seem also naturally to deprive
him of the right to the lien. And if the lien cannot be retained by
the creditor because he cannot claim the debt; nor by him to whom
the debt is transferred, because the lien cannot be transferred; it
would be extinguished by the transfer of the debt; and the difficulty
suggested as the reason for the rule cannot prevail, because it cannot and could not arise.
This view, however, is in opposition to the opinion of Judge Betts
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in The Active; 0lcott R. 287. In that case the material-man took the
note of the agent of the ship, in payment of supplies. The note was
not paid, and the libel was filed to establish the lien: the note being
in court and offered for cancellation. Judge Betts held, that the note
was not payment, unless agreed to be taken as such: that if not so
taken, the lien was suspended during the circulation of the note;
and the lien was restored when the note came back to the original holder. But I am not prepared to carry the doctrine to the
extent thus laid down. I concede the rule to be, that a note or bill
is not payment, unless it has been so agreed. The conduct of the.
parties may supply the place of; indeed may constitute the agreement. If the party taking a bill or note, uses it as money, by putting it in circulatien: giving ii the place of money : and making it
discharge all the functions which so much paper money would have
done, I cannot see in what manner the note or bill was held or
treated differently from money. 4 Rich. 59. Is not that use so
made of the bill or note, using Lord Eldon's language again,
"declaration plain," and "manifest intention," "of a purpose to
rely, not any longer upon the estate, (in this case the security,) but
upon the personal credit of the individual ?" But if this" be so, I
am less able to agree with the second proposition of Judge Betts,
that if the lien is divested, it can be revived -without a special agreement. I cannot consider the lien suspended, when the debt is transferred. I have shown that it is divested and extinguished by that
act. It cannot be contended that the endorsement is a temporary
transfer, for it is an assignment of the debt, with the credit of the
endorser as security. In BHarrisvs. Johnston, 3 Cranch, 811, in
treating of the operation of a note conditionally received, the court
said, " the endorsement of a note passes the property in it to another,
and is the evidence that it was sold for a valuable consideration."
The lien, if it did survive, would have to operate to secure the endorser
or drawer in the case of a bill, against the non-payment of the maker
or acceptor. But such is not the debt which the lien was implied
to receive; and if the debt were not of itself privileged, it could not
be made such by the effect of a covenant. Domat, p. 1, B. 3, see. 5.
I am not satisfied that it was, ever intended, or can be within the
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scope of this peculiar security or lien, that it should be invested with
the qualities of assignability, or negotiability, which belong to other
commercial securities. It was for the protection of the material
man, by securing to him his debt. All the purposes of commerce
are answered, and have been, by considering it as operative to this
extent. And while I do not see good, I apprehend evil in carrying
it farther. It would be impossible to preserve it in the sense of the
maritime law, and continue it in a state of suspension, while the
debt, to secure which it had been made, had been converted into a
pegotiable instrument, and passed from the original creditor to some
other person as his property. This security, as we have seen, is held
in peculiar favor, and entitled to great preference. To allow it to
be suspended for the material-man, during the time when a note or
bill is maturing in the hands of a third person who held it as owner,
would open a door to the greatest fraud. The evils of such a doctrine pressed upon the learned judge, when he admits that a bona
fide purchaser without notice, during the time of suspension of the
lien, might be protected in his purchase. Such an admission is
unavoidable, when we remember that the tendency of courts, and of
legislative bodies, is to discountenance secret liens, because of the
opportunities they furnish for the commission of fraud. But the
admission is also conclusive of the matter which I am now considering. For, if the security or lien may be postponed to a bona fide
purchaser without notice, then it is not that peculiar security which
the maritime law affords; and the existence of which is inseparable
from the precedence which belongs to.it. It is something essentially
different. But if it is not this security of the maritime law, it
must be, if it is at all, created by the local law of the State,
or by agreement of the parties. To neither of these can it
be referred; and thus the conclusion seems unavoidable that the
concession which must be made as to its effect, when suspended,
show that what is called its suspension is in fact its extinguishment.
Such is the rule in the French law. C'est un principe certainque,
quand la causse du privilege cesse, le privilege cesse aussi. Le
privilege accordd sur certain chose est de droit etroit, et il droit 4tre
plut~t restreint, lors principalement qu' il peut faire prejudice a
quel qu'un. Boulay Paty, tom. 1, 159.
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It seems to me the result of cases directly adjudged ; and of such
others as afford us a basis of deduction; that where a lien arises
under the maritime law, for the benefit of a material-man, it is not
waived or lost because a note or bill between the parties to the original contract has been taken by the creditor; (The Hilarity, Howl.
and B1. 91;) unless there is some evidence showing that the note
or bill was taken as payment. But if the party taking the note or
bill transfers it to another for a consideration, so that it becomes the
property of that person ; and thereby loses all right to the note or
bill; the implied lien of the maritime law does not follow the debt
which has been transferred; while the original creditor by the transfer of the debt, has ceased to have a right to the lien, which is
created only for his benefit. 'That thus, by the transfer, assumed
to be absolute, the lien is extinguished; nor will it be revived by
taking back the note. An agreement made, may give a new lien;
but the implied lien of the law is discharged.
The facts of the case to which this opinion is to be made applicable, are few and plain. The libellant advanced money for repairs
and supplies to a vessel in a foreign port. That the advance was
made is proved by the draft or bill of exchange which the captain
drew on his owner: that it was recognized as proper by the owner,
is proved by his acceptance of the draft. The William and .EmmeZine, Howl. & Blatchford, 66. I have said, that merely taking
this draft was not a waiver of the lien. The libel avers that it has
been the property of the libellant, and subject to his control; and
he now brings it. into court to be cancelled; delivered to the
owner, or otherwise -disposed of as the court shall direct. It seems
to me that the libellant is entitled to the relief he seeks. The
decree will be entered that the draft or bill of exchange be deposited
with the clerk, to be delivered to the owner who is the acceptor ;
and that the vessel be condemned and sold to pay the libellant the
amount of his advances, with interest and costs.
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In the District Court of the Uuited States for the District of
Maine-In Admiralty.
ROBERTS VS. SKOLFIELD ET AL.
1. An action for a joint tort against two or more cannot, in the admiralty, be
united with a tort against one separately, if the objection be taken.
2. The general maritime law was adopted by the constitution of the United States,
and no State can have a separate and distinct maritime law by itself.
3. This latr governs the crews of the vessels of the United States, wherever they go,
whether in a port.of the Union, or in a foreign port.
4. When the constitution adopts the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it adopts
also the law by which it is governed.
5. The power of the United States to govern seamen, may also be derived from the
commercial power.

The power to regulate commerce includes that of navi-

gation.
6. When a seaman engages in a commercial adventure, the laws of the United States
follow him until the voyage is completed, whether in a foreign country, or the
Union.
7. The commerce of the country is a unity, and wherever it goes it is governed and
protected by the laws of the United States.

Geo. .Fessenden and D.
. Fessenden, for the libellants.
Shepley N. Dana, for the respondents.
The facts in this case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
WARE, District Judge :-This is a libel against J. L. Skolfield
master, and W. 0. Fairfield, mate of the ship John W. Dimmich,
jointly, in a cause of damage. The libellant shipped at Portland,
Nov. 6, 1857, for a voyage to Mobile, thence to Europe, and back
to the United States. After the ship arrived at Mobile, she remained there about four months, waiting for a cargo, and while
lying in the bay, at the distance of several miles from the city, on
the 12th of January the events happened which are the subject of
this libel.
In the morning of that day, Roberts was employed in calking
the forecastle, Fairfield, the mate, being near him. Roberts asked
the mate for a calking mallet. The mate told him to work with
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a serving mallet, which he had in his hand; and Roberts replied
that he could not work so well with that as with a calking mallet.
More words, it seems, must have passed between them, for as
Roberts got up, the mate struck him a pretty hard blow on his
arm with the mallet which he had in his own hand. The noise
attracted the attention of the master, who was on the after part of
the-deck, and he immediately came forward, -with the master of
another vessel in port, who happened to be on board. They both
fell on Roberts, the mate standing by. The captain knocked him
down with him fist, and they both seized him by the hair or collar,
as often as he attempted to rise, and threw him down again; and
continued for some time striking and kicking him on his head,
face and shoulders, as he liy or attempted to rise. The boy
Lewis' who was at work near, and saw the whole affair, says that
they booted him all around the forecastle. Smith, also, the boatswain, who was near and saw most of the affray, says that as often as
Roberts attempted to get up, they seized him by the hair and
pulled him down, and repeated their blows -with their hands and
feet. The boatswain also confirms the testimony of Lewis, that
when they had done beating him, -the captain,.as he went aft, told
the hate that if the men gave him more of their sauce, to take
a handspike, and hit them on the head. This is also stated by
some of the rest of the crew.
The captain soon after left the ship, and Roberts, as he continued
his work, notwithstanding the beating and booting, asked the boy
Lewis to bring him some oakum. The mate told Lewis not to go,
and to let Roberts -get it himself. Roberts went, and as he was
returning with it, the mate met him, and took from his pocket a
slung shot, and struck two blows with it in his face, and one on the
back of his head. These blows were given with such violence
that severe wounds were made on the face and back part of his
head, from which blood flowed so freely as to run down on the
deck, and make a considerable puddle. Lewis, who was near,
thought there was nearly a quart. The description given by Smith,
the boatswain, rather confirms that of the boy. Roberts wiped
the blood from the deck with his shirt, which has been exhibited in
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court, and identified by the witnesses. It was saturated with blood,
and shows that there could not have been much exaggeration by the
witnesses. The blood continued for two days to ooze from the"
wound made on his nose. Roberts continued for several days to
complain of pain in his head, and kept his head bound up with a
handkerchief.
In a separate article the libel sets forth another tort committed
by the master during the same voyage, in the port of Havre, in
which the mate had no part. The counsel for the respondent objects to the union in the same libel of a joint action against two,
with an allegation as to a separate tort committed by one of the
parties, and on this ground he moves that the libel be dismissed as
multifarious. The like objection is niade to the third article of the
libel for the second assault of the mate in Mobile, being after the
captain had. left the ship.
The article for the tort in Havre does, in my opinion, render the
libel open to the objection of multifariousness. But it does not follow that the libel must be dismissed. That article may be struck
out by an amendment, and the libellant proceed in the suit for the
joint wrong of the two. For the second assault at Mobile by the
mate, after what had taken place the same morning and lut an
hour before, my opinion is that the*master cannot be exempted
from the responsibility. He left orders, that if any further difficulty occurred, for the mate to put an end to it with a hand-spike.
The mate, instead.of using this instrument, took from his pocket a
slung-shot. Either mode of punishment was illegal, and the mate
might fairly infer that, by directing one the master authorized the
other. If this assault with a slung-shot was unjustifiable, I think
the master ought to be jointly responsible for it. Elwell vs. Martin,
Ware's Rep., 45 Prattvs. Thomas, Id., 487.
But another objection is made, which goes to the whole libel, and
requires a more detailed and deliberate consideration. This is, that
the subject matter of the libel is not within the admiralty jurisdiction. The assault at Mobile, it is said, was committed while the
ship was lying within the body of a county, in the State of Alabama,
and thus was without the jurisdiction of this court. The objection,
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put into a more general formula, is that the admiralty has no jurisdiction over a tort committed by one of the ship's company against
another on board the ship in matters relating to the police of the
ship, and in the maintenance of discipline while the ship is lying in
a port of the United States, within the body of a county. As a matter of fact it may be doubted whether the ship was within the
limits of a county. But waiving this, and taking the objection in
its most general form, it involves a question of great importance to
the commerce of the country.
The jurisdiction of the admiralty, in matters of tort, depends on
the locality of the act, and the question, which this case raises is,
whether the navigable waters in the ports and harbors of the United
States are within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction granted
by the Constitution. It may be admitted that the common law
courts of England would prohibit the high court of admiralty from
taking cognizance of such a case. But the admiralty jurisdiction
of this court is derived from our own constitution ; and it appears
to me to have been too long settled tobe now brought into doubt;
that it is more extensive than that allowed by the Court of King's
Bench to the high court of admiralty in England, both in matters
of contract and tort, where it is determined by the locality of the
act. The judiciary act passed by the first congress that sat under
the constitution, assigned to the admiralty jurisdiction over all cases
of seizures made under laws of import and navigation on waters
navigable from the sea by vesselh of ten or more tons burthen, as
well as upon the high seas, without regard to county lines. For it
can hardly be necessary to remark, that such waters in harbors,
creeks and rivers, are by the common law included within the bodies
of counties. In the case of -TheVengeance, 3 Dallas, 297, and in that
of the Betsy and Charlotte, 4 Cranch, 443, the constitutionality of
this act was brought into controversy. The whole subject was exhausted by the elaborate argument of the claimant's counsel in the
latter case, and the court unanimously reaffirmed their former decision, and have since steadily adhered to it.
We have thus the decision of all the departments of the government, the legislative, executive and judicial, that the admiralty
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jurisdiction does extend to waters navigable from the sea by vessels
of ten or more tons burthen, and is not excluded by the fact that
those waters are within the body of a county. It may be said that
the case of. The l'evgeance, and those which followed it, apply only
to revenue seizures. But if revenue seizures within these waters
are rightfully put on the admiralty side of the court, no good reason
is perceived why torts committed on board American vessels in the
same waters, are nQt subject to the cognizance of the same courts.
Indeed this has been so often decided in cases of collision, taking
place in harbors and rivers, that it would seem at this day quite too
late to call it in question. It does not seem to be necessary on this
point to do more than to refer to the single case of the steamer
Magnolia, 20 How., 296,- decided at the last term of the Supreme
Court. That was a collision that took place in the river Alabama,
about two hundred miles above tide water; and yet it was held by
all the judges except two, that it was clearly within the admiralty
jurisdiction.
In such navigable waters, included within the limits of a county,
the admiralty has a concurrent jurisdiction with the common law
courts, and one or the other may take cognizance of a case according t6 the subject matter, whether it is of a terrene or maritime
nature, and perhaps, also, according to the operations of the parties,
whether their engagements and employments are on the land or the
sea. It is by these distinctions that it is to be determined what law applies and governs the case ; whether that of the land or sea. If this
case is governed by the maritime, the admirality is the proper
court to administer that law, and takes the jurisdiction. If the rights
of the parties are to be determined bythe local law of the place, then
the jurisdiction properly belongs to those courts. In the case of
the Magnolia's collision, by what court is it to be determined which
vessel was in fault? 'They met in a common highway, where each
had equal rights subject to the law. " That directed how they should
pass each other, whether to the right or the left, and what other
measures each was bound to take to avoid a collision. Was this the
law of navigation, the maritime law, the same that was their guide
at sea, or was it the highway laws of Alabama ? When the ques-
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tion is stated in this way it seems to answer itself. It is the law
of navigation, the maritime law that governs the case ; and this is
the law of the United States and not of any particular State.
When the constitution declared that the judicial power of the United
States should extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, this grant of judicial power carried with it ex necessitaterei
the law by which the jurisdiction should be regulated and governed,
and thus the maritime law became exclusively the law of the United
States. No one, I presume, will pretend that the State of New
York has a maritime differing from that of any other State in the
Union, or that any State has the power to alter that law, at least to
affect the rights of a citizen of*any other State, or to have any force
in the courts of the United States. If ever a doubt could have
existed on this subject, it is answered by the case of the steamboat
New York, 12 How. 328. In that case the steamer came in collision with a brig lying at anchor in the harbor, and the owners of
the brig libelled her for the damage. One of the points of defence
was, that the brig did not have her light suspended at the height of
twenty feet from the deck, as required by the law of that State.
The court said that, however such a regulation might govern the
courts of that State, and be applied to vessels engaged wholly in
the interior trade of the State, it was not binding on the courts of
'the United States, which are governed by the general maritime-law,
nor would it be applied to vessels engaged in the general commerce
of the country, and not exclusively in the interior trade of that
State. And the brig having such a light as satisfied the maritime
law, the objection was overruled. The principle on which the decision is founded is, that the maritime law is part and parcel of the
laws of the United States, and is the same for the citizens and the
ships and vessels of all the States, and not subject to be changed
by the local legislation of any particular State.
The doctrine of this decision applies to the case now before the
court. This is a libel by a seaman against two of the officers of the
ship for an assault in the bay of Mobile, while the ship was lying,
as is alleged, within the body of a county. By what law are the
rights of the parties to be determined ? By the maritime law of
11
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the United States, or the local law of Alabama ? Under our law
the officers have authority to maintain discipline, to enforce a respectful behavior on the part of the crew, and to compel obedience
to their orders by moderate and reasonable personal chastisement.
Under the common law, which is the law of Alabama, the hirer or
employer has no right to compel a hired servant to perform his contract, by blows. Every blow given as punishment would involve the
right of action. Suppose an assault to be committed in the harbor
of Canton on board of an American vessel, is the case to be tried
by the laws of the United States or those of China ? These cases
admit of but one answer. They are to be decided by the laws of
the United States. These laws extend the judicial power to all
cases that arise under them, and the jurisdiction must belong to
their courts. Whether they be of admiralty or common law jurisdiation, must depend on the particular circumstances of each case.
While the vessel is on the high seas, and until she arrives in port
and within the body of a county, the authority of the master in
maintaining the police of the vessel, and in enforcing obedience to
his orders, is derived from the maritime law. As soon as she passes
the line of a county, does that law cease, and the local law take its
place? and does the local law furnish the measure of his authority ?
If the seaman deserts, under the maritime law the master may retake and compel him by force to perform his engagements. Can the
employer of a hired servant, under the common law, compel him to
execute his contract by stripes and imprisonment? It appears to
me that there can be but one conclusion. Either the maritime law
governs during the whole engagement, or the law changes in every
new port the vessel enters during the voyage. The maritime law
follows the ship wherever she goes in the prosecution of her enterprise. It throws over the crew its shield for their protection, and
it upholds the officers in the exercise of all their reasonable and just
authority. This law, by the force of the grant of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, is, in my opinion, the law of the United States,
may be enforced by their courts, and is not subject to alteration by
the several States.
But there is, in my opinion, another element which belongs to
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this subject, and it is that indicated in the opinion of Judge McLean,
in the case of the Magnolia: "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is essentially a commercial power." 20 How. 804. By
means of this, and this only, the ship's crew is under a uniform law
during the whole period of their engagement, and their duties and
responsibilities do not change with every new"port they enter. A
seaman, by entering a foreign jurisdiction, may render himself
amenable to foreign laws, but his duty towards the ship, and the
authority of the officers over him, are measured by the laws of the
country to which the ship belongs. The constitution grants to
Congress the power "1to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States,- and with the Indian tribes." Art. 2,
§ 2. -Under this graht the commerce of the country becomes a
unity. It is not the commerce of the separate and individual
States of Massachusetts and New York, but the commerce of
the United States. Gibons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 194. In the
execution of this power, Congress has proceeded to make laws
for the government and regulation of ships and vessels, the instruments by which this commerce is mainly' carried on;. to provide the documents by which their nationality shall be verified, and
-which shall entitle them to the privileges of American vessels.
They become ships and vessels of the United States, and amenable
to and under the protection of our laws; and what.has a more
direct bearing on the present case; Congress has enacted laws regulating the contract between ship owners and the men by whom the
ships are navigated; their mutual duties and obligations, and providing penalties for the breach of these regulations; establishing,
also, rules of police, defining and limiting the powers and authority
of officers, and the rights and obligations of seamen. So far as
these regulations have been established by acts, they govern. The
authority of Congress to enact such laws has never been called in
question, and moreover the constitution itself has adopted the general maritime law, as it was received and practiced in the country
at the time when it was formed, having the same relation to the
maritime laws of Congress as the common law has to the statute
law of the country, where thr acts of Congress are silent. These
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laws follow the ship wherever she goes, and do not become inoperative, or a dead letter, in the whole or in any part of them, when
the ship arrives in and is lying within the body of a county. The
laws of revenue, of navigation, and of trade, remain in full force
and vigor over the ship wherever she floats; nor can I see any reason in law or public policy, why the laws which regulate the internal policy of the ship, do not also. If any of the ship's company
violate the local laws while lying in a harbor, they may be held
amenable to those laws. But for all their acts on board the ship,
which have relation to their rights or duties as members of the
ship's company, they are responsible to the laws of the United
States, and these rights and duties are to be measured by these
laws, and not by the local laws of the port, although the vessel may
be lying in waters within the body of a county. The laws which
regulate the police of a river are no more struck with.a paralysis in
passing a county line, than those of revenue and navigation.
I have examined this q'uestion of jurisdiction more at length than
would seem to be necessary, because I have not met with any reported case where the precise question involved in this has been
formally decided; and alsq, because it was stated at the argument
that this question had been decided by the District Court of Alabama against the jurisdiction, in a case arising in the same place as
this. I have not seen: the reasoning by which this decision, if any
such has been made, has been vindicated. My own examination
has led me to a different conclusion.
On the whole, my opinion is that the courts of the United States
have jurisdiction over a tort committed by one of the ship's company on another on board of a ship or vessel of the United States
while lying in a harbor, although she may be within the body of a
county. I am unable to distinguish this case from others, of collision taking place just as this did, in a harbor, nor do I think it
makes any difference whether the harbor be a foreign one or one
within this country. The laws of the United States follow the
ship while she is engaged in commerce wherever she goes.
That the constitution having adopted the general maritime law
of the country, as it existed and was received at the time when it
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was formed, as the maritime law of the United States, their courts
have jurisdiction of such a case as one " arising under the constitution and laws of the United States." Whether it be of admiralty
or common law jurisdiction depends on the facts of each particular
case. Under the grant of power to regulate commerce, Congress
has the power to regulate the internal police of vessels by vwhich that
commerce is carried on, and if the laws of Maine are violated within
the waters of a foreign or domestic port, the case is one of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction.
The right of the master to enforce obedience to his orders and
to correct the insolent and mutinous conduct of seamen by blows,
is not denied. It is an authority that grows out of the necessities
of the service. But it is also limited by those necessities. The
rightful authority of the master must be upheld, and if a seaman
is habitually disrespectful, insolent and mutinous in his conduct,
the execution of this authority will be looked upon with indulgence.
But this high power is not to be lightly resorted to on trifling
occasions; never are severe blows to be given, unless necessary to
enforce prompt obedience in a case of urge.ncy and to maintain
the subordination of the crew. Never are blows to be given with a
deadly or dangerous weapon, but in the most extreme cases. In
any other,'but in cases of the last urgency, it is an indictable offence,
and punishable by fine and imprisonment. Act of Congress, United
States Laws, vol. 4, page 776. Nor ought masters to inflict a
degrading or humiliating punishment, that would wound the feelings
of self-respect of a seaman. The humiliating punishment of scizing
up a seaman to the rigging and administering what, in the language
of the sea, is technically called a flogging, is specially prohibited
by law. U. S. Laws, vol. 9, page 515.
Both these rules were violated in the present case. The knocking a man down with the fist and then kicking him around the deck
on the head and shoulders, is a degrading punishment, involving both
cruelty and contempt. It is evidently so considered and felt by the
seamen, from the name given to this kind of punishment-" booting."
The wounds given to a man's feeling of self-respect, whether a
landsman or a seaman, are those that strike deepest into the heart.,
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and rankle with most bitterness, and are, of all, most likely to breed
an insubordinate and mutinous disposition, and that will wait for
and watch the opportunity of revenge. The second assault by tbe
mate with a slung-shot, was still more exceptionable. This is certainly a dangerous, and may be, in the ha.ds of a strong man, a
deadly weapon. Such a weapon is absolutely prohibited in all cases,
except of most extreme necessity, that admit of no delay, as a check
to mutiny. The blows, also, were given with great force, as is
certain from the wounds inflicted, the quantity of blood that came
from them, and the sears that yet remain. And what was the
provocation that called down this disgraceful and cruel'punishment ?
If any, it was of the slightest character that can well be imagined.
Possibly Roberts answered the mate with a little less courteousness than the conventionalrules of behavior on shipboard demanded,
and all this is left without mitigation or explanation. From all the
evidence, the crew appear to have been uniformly quiet, peaceable, and
without any tendency to disorder. Some'trouble had existed while
the ship lay in the bay waiting for a cargo, on account of the provisions. But this arose from the fault of the master, and from no
fault of the crew. They laid their complaints respectfullly before
the captain, and when they failed to obtain such relief as they had
reasonable claims for, they submitted without the smallest appearance of disorder or violence to the discipline of the ship.
I award two hundred dollars jointly against the master and
mate, with costs.

STATE LEGISLATION AS TO MILITIA.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of .Massachusetts,December, 1859.
INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.'
QUESTIONS:
1. Whether the legislature of this Commonwealth can constitutionally provide for
the enrolment in the militia, of any persons other than those enumerated in the
Act of Congress approved May 8, 1792, entitled, "An

Act more effectually to

provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout
the United States?"
2. Whether the aforesaid Act of Congress, as to all matters therein provided for,
and except as amended by subsequent Acts, has such force in this Commonwealth,
independently of, or notwithstanding any State legislation, that all officers under
the State government, civil and military, are bound by its provisions?

ANswERS.-The undersigned, justices of the Supreme Judicial

Court, having considered the above stated interrogatories propounded to them by the governor and council, do hereby, in answer
thereto, respectfully submit the following opinion:We are first, as preliminary to any direct answer to the inquiries,
to consider what the militia was, as understood in the constitution
and laws, both of this Commonwealth and of the United States. It
Was an institution, not only theoretically known but- practically
adopted and carried into effect in all the colonies and provinces
before the revolution, and even before the formation of a Congress
for any purpose. The utility and capabilities of this institution for
military purposes had been put to a severe test by the events of the
revolution, and were well understood before either of these constitutions was adopted.
Prior to the revolution, the establishment and control of this
institution was within the jurisdiction of the respective colonial and
provincial governments, because these were the only local governments, acting directly upon the rights and interests of the inhabitants
within their respective territorial limits. It was constituted by designating, setting apart and putting in military array, under suitable
military officers, all the able bodied male inhabitants of the province,
IWe

are indebted to the courtesy of the learned Chief Justice of Massachusetts

for this interesting paper.
Re.

It was concurred in by the whole Court.-Eds. Am. L.
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with certain specified exceptions, and was held in readiness upon certain exigenciesjand in the manner provided by law, to act under military orders as a military armed force. It was the constituting of a
citizen soldiery, in contradistinction to a regular standing army.
Such having been the jurisdiction of the several provincial governments, it naturally devolved upon the respective State governments,
after the declaration of independence, and during the earlier years
of the revolutionary war. During that period, all were acting under
the articles of confederation, which was rather a league between the
States for mutual defence, than a government acting directly upon
the people of those States.
The constitution of Massachusetts was adopted and went into
operation in 1780. It recognized the militia as an essential department of the constitution of its government, and provided for the
enrolment of the men, the appointment of the officers, their duties
and powers, with all the details to give efficiency to this cherished
arm of defence, and declaring its proper stibordination to the civil
power. It also, in the declaration of rights, distinctly declared the
right of the people to bear arms. But this constitution, recognizing
the existence of the articles of confederation between the States, and
the powers thereby vested in the Congress of the United States,
and pcssibly anticipating important changes therein, reserved from
the State governments all powers then vested, or which might afterwards be constitutionally vested in Congress.
Several years afterwards, in 1789, the constitution of the United
States having been adopted by the required number of States, including Massachusetts, went into operation, and became the law of
the land. This system was founded upon an entirely different
principle from that of the confederation. Instead of a league among
sovereign States, it was a government formed by the people, and to
the extent of the enumerated subjects, the jurisdiction of which was
confided to and vested in the general government, acting directly
upon the people. "We the people," are the authors and constituents ; and "in order to form a more perfect union," was the declared purpose of the constitution of a general government.
It was a bold, wise, and successful attempt to place the people

AS TO MILITIA.

under two distinct governments, each sovereign and independent,
within its own sphere of action, and dividing the jurisdiction between them, not by territorial limits, and not by the relation of
superior and subordinate, but classifying the subjects of government and designating those over -which each has entire and independent jurisdiction. This object the constitution of the United
States proposed to accomplish by a specific enumeration of those
subjects of general concern, in -which all have a general interest, and
to the defence and protection of which the undivided force of all the
States could be brought promptly and directly to bear.
Some of these were our relations with foreign powers-war and
peace-treaties, foreign commerce and commerce amongst the several
States, with others specifically enumerated; leaving to the several
States their full jurisdiction over rights of persons and property,
and, in fact, over all other subjects of. legislation, not thus vested
in the general government. All powers of government, therefore,
legislative, executive and judicial, necessary to the full and entire
administration of government over these enumerated subjects, and
all powers necessarily incident thereto, are vested in the general
government; and all other powers, expressly as well as by implication, are reserved to the States.
This brief and comprehensive view of the nature and character of
the government of the United States, we think-is not inappropriate
to this discussion, because it follows as a necessary consequence that,
so far as the government of the United States has jurisdiction over
any subject, and acts thereon within the scope of its authority, it
must necessarily be paramount, and must render nugatory all legislation by any State, which is repugnant to and inconsistent -with
it. There may, perhaps, in some few cases, be a concurrent jurisdiction, as in case of direct taxation of the same person and property; but until it shall practically extend to a case where there
may be an actual interference, by seizing the same property at
the same time, the exercise of the powers by the one is not,
in its necessary effect, exclusive of the exercise of a like power
by the other; but in such case, they are not repugnant. That one
must be so paramount, to prevent constant collision, is obvious;
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and, accordingly, the constitution expressly provides that the constitution and all laws and treaties, made in pursuance of its authority, shall be the supreme law of the land.
Assuming that such was the manifest object of the people of the
United States, and of the several States, respectively, in establishing the two distinct governments in each State, we proceed to the
more direct consideration of the questions propounded.
The establishment of a militia was manifestly intended to be
effected by arranging the able bodied men in each and all the States
in military array, arming and placing them under suitable officers,
but without forming them into a regular standing army, to be ready
as the exigency should require, to defend and protect the rights of
all, whether placed under the administration of the local or general
government, to be called out by either in the manner and for the
purposes determined by the constitution and laws, or either. It was
one and the same militia, for both purposes, under one uniform
organization and discipline, and to be bommanded by the same
officers. Were it otherwise, were the general and the State governments to have their own militia, the results would have been, that
there would be, within the bosom of each State, a large embodied
military force, not by its organization amenable to the laws or subject to the orders of the State government; and also a similar force,
on which the general government would have no right to call for
aid to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or execute the laws; a
state of things, not only rendering each, to a great extent, inefficient and powerless, but also entirely destructive of that harmony
and union which were intended to characterize the combined action
of both governmbnts. We find, therefore, that the functions of
both are called into activity, in constituting this military force and
carrying it into practical operation.
The constitution of the United States having charged the general
government with the administration of the foreign relations of the
whole 'Union, and the military defence of the whole, provides,
(Article 1, section 8,) " That congress shall have power to provide
for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; to provide for organizing,
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arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of
them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers,
and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline
prescribed by congress."
"Organizing" obviously includes the power of determining who
shall compose the body known as the militia. The general principle
is, that a militia shall consist of the able bodied male citizens. But
this description is too vague and indefinite to be laid down as a
practical rule ; it requires a provision of positive law to ascertain
the exact age which shall be deemed neither too young nor too old
to come within the description. One body of legislators might
think the suitable ages would be from 18 to 45, others from 16 to
30 or 40, others from 20 to 50. Here the power is given to the
general government to fix the age precisely, and thereby to put an
end to doubt and uncertainty; and the power to determine who
shall compose the militia, when executed, equally determines who
shall not be embraced in it, because all not selected are necessarily
excluded.
The question upon the construction of tlbis provision of the constitution is, whether this power to. determine who shall compose the
militia, is exclusive. And we are of opinion that it is. A power
when vested in the general government is not only exclusive when
it is so declared in terms, or when the State is prohibited from the
exercise of the like power, but also when the exercise of the same
power by the State is superseded and necessarily impracticable and
impossible after its exercise by the general government. For instance, when the general government have exercised their power to
establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, that is, laws for sequestering and administering the estate of a living insolvent debtor;
when one set of commissioners and assignees of such estate have
taken possession of property, with power to sell and dispose of it,
and distribute the proceeds, another set of officers, under another
law, cannot take and dispose of the same property. The one power
is necessarily repugnant to the other; if one is paramount, the
other is void. We think the present case is similar. The 'general
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government having authority to determine who shall and who may
not compose the militia, and having so determined, the State
government has no legal authority to prescribe a different enrolmenit.
This power was early carried into execution by the Act of Congress of May, 1792, being an "Act more effectually to provide for
the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout
the United States." This Act specially directs who shall be, and
-by necessary implication, who may not be enrolled in the militia.
This is strengtlened by a provision, that each State may by law
exempt persons embraced in the class for enrolment, according as
the peculiar form and particular organization of its separate government may require; but there is no such provision for adding to the
class to be enrolled.
We are therefore of opinion that the legislature of this Commonwealth cannot constitutionally provide for the enrolment in the
militia of any persons, other than those enumerated in the Act of
Congress of May, 1792, hereinbefore cited.
We do not intend, by the foregoing opinion, to exclude the existence of a power in the State to provide by law for arming and
equipping other bodies of men, for special service of keeping guard
and making defence, under special exigencies, or otherwise, in any
case not coming within the prohibition of that clause in the constitution, article 1, section 10, which withholds from the State the
power "to keep troops ;" but such bodies, however armed or organized, could not be deemed any part of "The Militia," as contemplated and understood in the constitution and laws of M,assachusetts
and of the United States, and, as we understand, in the question
propounded for our consideration.
Nor is this question, in our opinion, affected by the article 2 of
the amendments of the constitution, of the following tenor: "A
well-regulted militia being necessary to the security of a free state,
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed."
This, like similar provisions in our own declaration of rights, declares a great general right, leaving it for other more specific con-

